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Douglas: Medicaid Waivers and Consumer Protection: Evidence from the State

Medicaid Waivers and Consumer Protection:
Evidence from the States
Tracy Douglas*
In Indiana, Sue Fredericks struggled to stay insured through the Healthy
Indiana Plan (HIP), which is Indiana's version of the Affordable Care Act's
(ACA) Medicaid Expansion.' She lacked her boss' signature on her
verification of employment for the yearly determination, so the state
cancelled her insurance because she did not prove her income. 2 She called
the helpline and was told she needed to apply for the HIP again, which meant
starting from the beginning. 3 Thus, she gave up, even though she qualified
for Medicaid based on her income. 4 She was also confused by the letters
she received from the managed care organization (MCO) in charge of her
health plan and did not understand the fees she needed to pay for coverage.
She was surprised when HIP did not cover bills she incurred for a broken
ankle before receiving coverage. 6 The restrictions put in place by Indiana
through a section 1115 demonstration waiver - resubmitting proof of income
every year, paying a monthly premium, and not having retroactive coverage
-7 impeded Sue's access to Medicaid, but the harmful effects on people like
Sue have not been highlighted in the political or academic discussion of
Medicaid waivers.
Legal scholars have addressed some aspects of access with Medicaid
waivers and Medicaid expansion. A few scholars discuss problems with the
* Tracy Douglas is the former Interim Director of the Community Preservation Clinic at
the University of Illinois College of Law. Special thanks to Amanda Hall of Indiana Legal
Services. She is fighting the good fight. Also thanks to Reema Lateef for her research
assistance.
1. Tracie McMillan, How One Company Is Making Millions Off Trump's War on the
Poor, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/20 18/12/how-onecompany -is-making-millions-off-trumps-war-on-the-poor/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Approved Changes in Indiana'sSection 1115 Medicaid
Waiver Exception, HENRY J. KAIsER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/approved-changes-in-indianas-section-1 115medicaid-waiver-extension/.
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waiver process and whether waivers are permitted under the law." Some
defend waivers as allowing policy innovation and compromise.' Others
analyze the political rhetoric in expansion states, comments before
administrative agencies, and advocacy by Medicaid beneficiaries.' 0
Scholars also look at problems of managed care and access to care." They
have not, however, looked at the evidence of how the policies sanctioned by
these waivers are operating in practice and how they are affecting access to
Medicaid. The empirical evidence from waiver states suggests that, instead
of improving state Medicaid programs and expanding access to health
insurance for low-income people, section 1115 and section 1915 waivers
have, in practice, impeded access and made it more difficult for enrollees to
participate in Medicaid.12
This article will examine empirical evidence from waiver states and
demonstrate that these policies are destructive and antithetical to the
objectives of Medicaid in contradiction to the purpose of waivers. The
waivers, in effect, outsource administrative processes to private companies
and leave Medicaid enrollees entangled in a web designed to impede access
to healthcare and health insurance, at the mercy of a bureaucracy that they
often do not understand. 13 The outsourcing to private insurance companies
is similar to how the Obama administration farmed out the Making Home
8. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Out ofthe Black Box and Into the Light: Using
Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable CareAct's Medicaid
Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALT POL'Y, L., & EHics 213 (2015) [hereinafter Watson Black
Box]; see also generallyLaura D. Hermer, On the Expansion of "Welfare" and "Health"
Under Medicaid, 9 ST. LOUIS UNIV. J. OF HEALT L. AND POL'Y, 235 (2016); see also
generally Sidney D. Watson, Premiums andSection 1115 Waivers: What CostMedicaid
Expansion?, 9 ST. Louis U. J. HEALT L. & POL'Y 265 (2016) [hereinafter Watson
Premiums].
9. See generallyBarron & Rakoff, supra note 28, at 265; see also generally Gilliam E.
Metzger, Agencies, Polarizationand the States, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1739 (2015); see also
generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV.
953 (2016).

10. See generally Colleen M. Grogan, Phillip M. Singer, & David K. Jones, Rhetoric and
Reform in Waiver States, 42 J. HEALT POL., POL'Y, & L. 247 (2017); see also generally

&

Marian Jarlenski, Philip Rocco, Renuka Tipimeni, Amy Jo Kennedy, Nivedita Gunturi,

&

Julie Donohue, Shaping Health Policyfor Low-Income Populations:An Assessment of
Public Comments in a New Medicaid Waiver Process, 42 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 1039
(2017); see also generallyAshley Tallevi, Out ofSight, Out of Mind? Measuring the
Relationshipbetween PrivatizationandMedicaid Self-Reporting, 43 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y,
& L. 137 (2018).
11. See generally Jacobi, infra note 20; see also generallyBrad Wright, Andrew J. Potter
Matthew C. Nattinger, Iowa Wavering on Medicaid:From Expansion to Modernization, 41
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 287 (2016); see also generally Crossley, infra note 21.
12. Grogan et al., supranote 10, at 247; Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1043 (showing

Medicaid Section 115 Waivers were approved in 5 states that limited benefits for nonfrail
adults).
13. Jacobi, infra note 20.
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Affordable loan modifications with little oversight to the very banks that
caused the housing crisis in 2008 and left those homeowners vulnerable to a
confusing process.
Part I provides a background on section 1115 and 1915(b) waivers. Part
II looks at the state of scholarship on waivers while Part III examines the
available evidence from waiver states. Part IV concludes with a proposal for
changing the conversation to include a discussion of consumer protection.
I. SECTION 1115

AND SECTION

1915 WAIVERS, A HISTORY

Section 1115 and section 1915(b) of the Social Security Act allow states
to deviate from Medicaid program requirements in their state plans after
receiving permission from the federal government.1 5 Section 1115 waivers,
otherwise known as demonstration waivers, test new approaches to
Medicaid,1 6 while section 1915 waivers allow states to use home and
community-based services and managed care.' 7 The intended purpose of
Medicaid waivers, especially section 1115 waivers, is to test ideas that are
not consistent with program requirements."' Waivers must also improve
Medicaid and serve the objective of Medicaid, which is to improve access to
health insurance and healthcare for low-income people.19
Managed care allows states to contract with commercial plans that manage
healthcare claims and payments to providers instead of a state agency
administering Medicaid. 20 At first, every use of managed care required a
waiver, but Congress amended the law in 1997 to allow voluntary managed
care enrollment without a waiver with the exception of children with special
needs and dual eligibilities.21 This means states must have a waiver to require
those recipients to be in managed care. 22 Since the late 90s, managed care

14. Gretchen Morgenson, A Slack Lifeline for Drowning Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (July
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/business/pulling-down-underwater-

borrowers.html.
15. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014); see also Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1396 (2018).
16. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014).
17. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b)(c) (2018).
18. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (2018).
19. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2018).
20. John V. Jacobi, Medicaid, Managed Care, and the Missionfor the Poor, 9 ST. Louis U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 189 (2016).
21. Mary A. Crossley, GivingMeaning to "MeaningfulAccess" in MedicaidManaged
Care, 102 KY. L. J. 1, 14 (2014).

22. Medicaid Program; Medicaid Managed Care, 66 Fed. Reg. 43613, 43615 (proposed
Aug. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438).
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expanded across all of the states; 23 in 2010, thirty-five states and D.C. used
managed care. 24
Section 1115 waivers predate Medicaid by three years with the original
purpose of allowing experiments in state-administered public welfare
programs authorized by the Social Security Act; 2 5 therefore, section 1115
demonstration waivers have existed since the 1965 creation of Medicaid as a
program of health insurance for certain impoverished populations, such as
pregnant women, children, and the disabled.26 Indeed, the concept of a
waiver from federal law has existed for some time, at least since the 1960s, 27
allowing Congress to frame the regulatory approach while giving the agency
freedom in application and enforcement of the law. 28 However, the nature
of section 1115 waivers changed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision
that Medicaid expansion through the ACA could not be mandatory. 29 To
expand Medicaid in states hostile to the expansion, the federal government
agreed to policy concessions otherwise not allowed by the Social Security
Act, including premiums, lockout periods, disenrollment for untimely
renewals, and co-payments. 3 0 President Trump's administration changed the
character of these policy concessions by actively encouraging work
requirement proposals and granting waiver applications to those that
requested them.31
A. Section 1115 Waivers: Experimenting with ProgramRequirements
Section 1115 waivers allow states with federal approval to try novel
approaches that differ from the requirements of Medicaid and conduct an
23. Marguerite E. Burns, MedicaidManaged Care and Health CareAccess for Adult
Beneficiaries with Disabilities, 44 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1521, 1522 (2009).
24. Kyle J. Caswell & Sharon K. Long, The Expanding Role ofManaged Care in the
MedicaidProgram:Implicationsfor Health CareAccess, Use, and Expendituresfor
Nonelderly Adults, INQUIRY 1, 1 (2015).
25. Sara Rosenbaum, The Trump AdministrationRe-Imagines Section 1115 Medicaid
Demonstrations-AndMedicaid,HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20171109.297738/full/.
26. Social Security Amendment of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965)). Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1040.
27. Edward H. Stiglitz, ForcesofFederalism, Safety Nets, and Waivers, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 125, 131 (2017).
28. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
265 (2013).
29. Anne McKenzie, Section 1115 Waivers, The Future ofMedicaidExpansion, 27
HEALTH LAW. 12, 13-15 (2015).

30. Elizabeth Hinton, MaryBeth Musumeci, Robin Rudowitz, Larisa Antonisse, & Cornelia
Hall, Section 1115 MedicaidDemonstration Waivers: The CurrentLandscape ofApproved
and Pending Waivers, HENRY J. KAISERFAM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2019),

https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section- 1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-thecurrent-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/.
3 1. Id
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empirical evaluation of the trial period. 3 2 The trial period is typically a fiveyear period and can be extended, usually for three years.33 Additionally,
section 1115 waivers must further the objectives of Medicaid and cannot
waive some requirements.34 For example, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) cannot waive the federal matching payment system
or the right to a fair hearing. 3 5
Waivers began as a Kennedy-era law intended to let states test new
approaches to social welfare programs under the Social Security Act.36
Indeed, they were described as a minor provision that would allow research. 37
Section 1115 waivers were used sparingly for Medicaid until the 1990s and
2000s. 38 During this time, waivers came into heavy use as both President
Clinton and President George W. Bush's administrations wanted to expand
health insurance to childless adults, 39 and with the Bush administration
wanting to expand privatization of Medicaid. 40 One view, similar to those
who argue that waivers promote compromise, is that the Clinton and Bush
administrations viewed waivers as a way to respond to states' desires and not
as a way to further policy learning. 4 1 The ACA expanded Medicaid to cover
childless adults aged nineteen to sixty-four with incomes up to 133 percent
of poverty,42 but in 2012, the Supreme Court made Medicaid expansion
optional. 43 As a result, power transferred to the states because the federal
government could not mandate expansion; instead, states could negotiate for
changes to the program through waivers in exchange for agreeing to expand
Medicaid.
B. Section 1915 Waivers: Allowing Managed Care
States outsource the administration of Medicaid to private insurance
companies through managed care, authorized either by statute for voluntary
32. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014).; see also Hinton et al., supra note 30, at
1-2.
33. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014).; see also Hinton et al., supra note 30, at
1-2.
34. Hinton et al., supra note 30, at 2.
35. Hinton et al., supra note 30, at 2.
36. Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 3.
37. Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 and
Proposalsfor Health Insurancefor the Aged, Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 5 (1962).
38. Watson Black Box, supra note 8, at 219; see also Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at
1041.
39. Watson Black Box, supra note 8, at 219; see also Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at
1041.
40. Hermer supra note 8, at 238; see also Jarlenski et al., supra note 10.
41. Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1042.
42. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 49 Stat. 620, 1982
(1935) (codified as amended at U.S.C. § 1396a (2012).
43. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2020

5

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 28 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 3

106

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 28

enrollment or by waiver for children with special needs and dual
eligibilities. 44
Before the rise of managed care, states used the fee-forservice (FFS) model where an enrollee selected a provider who accepted
Medicaid, and then that provider submitted claims for reimbursement to the
state for each instance of service provided to the enrollee.
Medicaid
managed care began in the 1980s, but by the 1990s, states turned to it to
increase quality of care and improve access to providers.4 6 States also
justified Medicaid managed care as a cost-saving measure on the theory that
commercial plans would cost less than the traditional FFS model because
capitation payments would incentivize providers to offer efficient services to
control costs. 47
Managed care organizations (MCO) function much like a managed health
care plan in private health insurance by using a combination of primary care
physicians, referrals to specialists, prior authorizations, and care coordination
to control access to services.48 The state pays a capitation payment per
enrollee, which is a fixed monthly payment, and the MCO provides the
necessary services to the enrollee. 49 Although the use of MCOs grew
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, expansion to include enrollees with
disabilities occurred largely as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and the
adoption of the ACA.so States wanted to control Medicaid costs when they
experienced a decline in state tax revenues after the financial crisis and an
expected increase in the number of Medicaid enrollees from expansion in the
ACA. 5 1 By 2014, thirty-nine states used managed care to provide services,
and in 2016, estimates projected that 76 percent of the Medicaid population
would be enrolled in managed care. 52
Although the political discussion has focused on lowering costs and
improving access to care, consideration of the effects of leaving enrollees at
the mercy of MCOs that have their own bureaucracies separate from the state
agency is missing from the discussion. Indeed, most of the legal scholarship
on Medicaid waivers focuses on whether the waivers are an example of
compromise between states and the federal government or not allowed by the

44. Crossley, supra note 21, at 14.
45. Kiyoshi Yamaki et al., Impact ofMedicaidManaged Care on Illinois'sAcute Health
Services Expendituresfor Adults with Intellectualand DevelopmentalDisabilities, 56
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 133, 133 (2018).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Jacobi, supra note 20, at 201.
Yanaki et al., supra note 45, at 134.
Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 133.
Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 133.
Yanaki et al., supra note 45, at 134
Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 134.
Wright et al., supra note 11, at 294.
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Social Security Act.5 3 The effects of these policies as demonstrated in
empirical studies is absent from the discussion, which this article seeks to
remedy.
II. STATE OF SCHOLARSHI AND RESEARCH

Legal scholarship has addressed the concept of waivers from federal law
as a policy." The first wave of scholarship defended waivers as an example
of federalism and flexibility in regulation. 5 In this view, Congress writes
legislation as a first attempt at regulation and then the administrative state
makes a workable scheme, using waivers if necessary.5 6 Waivers are a
means of controlling concerns because the application of waivers makes the
regulatory scheme less rigid. 7 Congressional gridlock and partisan
polarization prevent legislation from advancing in Congress, while agencies
advance the agenda of the President, and in such a polarized atmosphere,
waivers can give power to states in negotiations with agencies. 5 " Legislative
gridlock leads to executive power in policymaking through agencies, but
states have power through waivers. 5 9 Seen through this lens, Medicaid
waivers are an example of accommodation and compromise with the states.60
Medicaid waivers also allowed expansion in so-called red states by enabling
policymakers "to meet in the middle." 6 1 While the aforementioned
scholarship generally approves of waivers, especially Medicaid waivers, as a
tool of compromise and accommodation from the viewpoint of
administrative law and federalism, later scholarship began to question
whether some policies implemented through section 1115 waivers are

allowed.62
More recent critical scholarship makes the case that the Secretary does not
have the power to waive portions of Medicaid requirements that some states
seek to waive with their section 1115 applications.63
Previous legal
scholarship was lacking because it did not address inequality and viability of
safety net programs. 64 In this more critical light, waivers should not be
cheered but viewed with suspicion because they are a devolution in offering
53. See, e.g. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 268 (discussing the legal restrictions on

states issuing Medicaid waivers).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., Watson Black Box, supra note 8.
See, e.g. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 28.
Barron & Rakoff, supra note 28, at 269, 336.
Barron & Rakoff, supra note 28, at 270.
Metzger, supra note 9, at 1748.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 9, at 955.
Metzger, supra note 9, at 1782.
McKenzie, supra note 29, at 17.
Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 269.
Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 269.
Stiglitz, supra note 27, at 128.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2020

7

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 28 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

108

Vol. 28

stingy benefits and agencies not having enough information while scholars
cheer policy innovation and compromise, not its effects. 65 Such a suspicious
perspective points out that the ACA added notice and comment requirements
to the section 1115 waiver process, but the Secretary does not have authority
to waive parts of the law banning premiums and co-payments, nor does the
Secretary have the power to authorize work requirements.66 Instead of
accepting it as a given, the Secretary needs to spell out how he has this
authority. 67

Delving more specifically into waiver states, the HIP was justified as
imposing personal responsibility on Medicaid expansion beneficiaries by
requiring premiums, co-payments, disenrolling and lockouts,68 while
Oregon's program aimed to use a waiver to contain costs by emphasizing
better outcomes, to provide better care and to improve health. 69 Before
approving requests, the Secretary needs more data to support the idea behind
the changes, i.e. that personal responsibility requirements support the
objectives of Medicaid, which aim to increase coverage, increase access,
improve health outcomes, and increase efficiency and quality of care. 70
Since the objective of Medicaid is not to teach personal responsibility, then
the waiver proposals should be rejected. 7
Recent waivers approved work requirements.72 It can be argued, though,
that they not only reduce coverage but also do not promote Medicaid
objectives or comply with legal requirements and are inconsistent with
Congress specifically never approving work requirements for Medicaid. 73
Consistent with this analysis, courts should find them arbitrary and
capricious. 74 The court in Stewart v. Azar concluded the same in rejecting
Kentucky's work requirements. 5 While these articles discuss the specifics
of waivers in Indiana and Oregon, for example, they do not look at what
practical effects the waivers have had on the Medicaid population, largely
because the data was not available yet. The data is, however, an important
consideration in evaluating whether these waiver policies do, in fact, further
the objectives of Medicaid or instead, create barriers to access to insurance
and care.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Stiglitz, supra note 27, at 129-30.
Watson Black Box, supra note 8, at 213.
Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 296.
Hermer, supra note 8, at 253.
Hermer, supra note 8, at 258-59.
Hermer, supra note 8, at 256.
Hermer, supra note 8, at 258.

72.

David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The Case of Medicaid

Eligibility Waivers, 65 UCLAL. REv. 1590, 1599 (2018).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018).
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However, there have been some empirical studies in the legal scholarship
76
on Medicaid expansion and waivers requested to implement expansion.
One study showed that support for Medicaid expansion varied widely by race
and that when the size of a state's African American population increases
and white support for expansion is low, there is less likelihood that expansion
will occur.
A study on comments submitted in the notice and comment
period of the waiver process found that comments submitted by citizens
tended to include personal stories and also mentioned specific provisions of
the waiver while advocacy groups requested specific policy changes. 7 " The
study concluded that specific policy suggestions could affect waiver approval
because CMS placed limitations on some waivers. 7 9 The authors, however,
believe there is a role for increasing public engagement in the comment
process as a way to build a constituency among low-income citizens; indeed,
they found that sixty-four percent of comments were submitted by citizens.so0
However, that hopefulness of building a constituency is undermined by
another study suggesting that an effect of states outsourcing administration
to private insurance companies may be that beneficiaries do not realize they
are on Medicaid and thus, do not advocate or participate when changes are
proposed."
Those proposed changes often used specific rhetoric to make the case for
limiting the state Medicaid programs.8 2 One study on political rhetoric in red
states that implemented the Medicaid expansion found that conservative
politicians argued they were not expanding Medicaid or building on the
program because they were using a private option to expand or were
imposing personal responsibility requirements. 83 The effect was to push
rhetoric to the right in political terms and question the deservingness of the
Medicaid expansion population. 4 Legal scholarship has not, however,
looked at the evidence from the states about the waivers' effects or checked
to see if the political rhetoric and justifications are supported by the evidence.
In other words, the question must be asked whether the waivers actually
encourage personal responsibility or consumer behaviors.
Such an
examination shows that they do neither, which is discussed in detail below.
76. See, e.g., Medicaid Waiver Tracker:Approved and PendingSection 1115 Waivers by
State, HENRY J. KAISERFAM. FOUND, (Mar. 01, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-

brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115 -waivers-by-state/.
77. Colleen M. Grogan & Sunggeun (Ethan) Park, The Racial Divide in State Medicaid
Expansions, 42 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 539, 539 (2017).
78. Jarlenski et al., supranote 10, at 1049.
79. Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1057.
80. Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1039, 1049.
81. Tallevi, supra note 10, at 164.
82. Jarlenski et al, supra note 10, at 1055.
83. Grogan et al., supranote 10, at 248.
84. Grogan et al., supra note 10, at 249.
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III. EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES

A. ManagedCare: Outsourcingto PrivateInsurance Companies
Medicaid managed care outsourced the administration of state Medicaid
plans to private insurance companies. 85 Waivers were required for this
process to occur, so many section 1115 applications were for managed care
in the 1990s. 8 6 However, Congress specifically authorized voluntary
enrollment without a waiver, but a waiver is still needed to include disabled
children and elderly adults.1 7 States often claimed that managed care would
reduce costs and improve access by leaving the FFS model that many doctors
rejected." Instead, capitation rates are used whereby the state pays the
company one fee for a beneficiary.8 9 This shift from the FFS model has been
shown to not be associated with dramatic changes in health care access, but
it is associated with decreased access for providers. 90 It has been shown that
increases in the use of Medicaid managed care is associated with an increase
in the probability of an ER visit and difficulty in seeing a specialist.91
Managed care focuses on the payment of claims rather than the social
determinants of health for low-income people, 92 and research indicates that
it does not save money or improve access to care, contrary to the official
justifications.93 Studies show that MCOs have not lowered costs in practice,
especially for nonelderly enrollees overall or nonelderly adults with
disabilities. 94 Additionally, the evidence showing that MCOs increase access
to care is mixed. 95 Some studies show increased reliance on emergency
departments as a usual source of care while others show a decrease in the use
of the emergency department. 9 6 Other studies show that mandatory MCO
enrollees did not have better access to care, while others found that MCOs
had some improvements in access to care.97
Demonstrating the rise in Medicaid managed care, plans serve fifty-four
million enrollees, up from twenty million in 2000, and those plans received

85. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 1.
86. Hermer, supra note 8, at 238.
87. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 1.
88. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 133-134.
89. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 133.
90. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 2.
91. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 8-9.

92. See Jacobi, supra note 20, at 194 (demonstrating that although Medicaid serves the
poor population, where social determinants of health play a major factor in their healthcare,
the Medicaid program only provides coverage for "mainstream" healthcare services).
93. Jacobi, supra note 20, at 201.
94. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 1.
95. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 1-2.
96. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 1-2.
97. Caswell & Long, supra note 24, at 2.
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nearly $300 billion from state governments, up from $60 billion a decade
ago. 98 States with so-called personal responsibility requirements in their
waivers have mixed histories with managed care. 99 Indiana and Michigan
had managed care plans before waiver applications, while Iowa and Arkansas
had virtually no Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care before the
waivers. 'oo The political conversation in these waiver states revolved around
personal responsibility for Medicaid enrollees, but the actions of managed
care organizations have generally not been questioned.' 0
Managed care plans receive billions in tax payments as more than twothirds of Medicaid enrollees are served by those plans in thirty-eight states,
but MCOs receive little oversight from state governments.1 02 Plans receive
payments from states to pay for enrollees, but the MCOs can keep what they
do not spend.1 03 This means profits come from greater efficiency or, more
cynically, from not paying for necessary care and reaping the rewards of
excess government payments.' 0 4 One company, Maximus, receives millions
in contracts from states to manage Medicaid systems. 05 Maximus then
communicates directly with Medicaid beneficiaries, which can lead
beneficiaries to misunderstand that they are not Medicaid enrollees.1 06 This
misunderstanding could further lead to beneficiaries not advocating when
changes are proposed.' 07 With few exceptions, state governments have not
questioned MCOs to determine if there is a return on their investment in
managed care; studies by academics and newspaper investigations show
there is no savings while the industry insists it saves money and improves
care.os Similarly, individual case studies in Iowa, Texas, Illinois and
Kentucky show that there are severe administrative issues with state MCOs,
issues that leave beneficiaries and their families at the mercy of a system they
do not understand and that is rigged against them.1 09

98. Chad Terhune, PrivateMedicaid PlansReceive Billions in Tax Dollars, with Little
Oversight, NPR (Oct. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-

shots/20 18/10/18/6578623 37/private-medicaid-plans-receive-billions-in-tax-dollars-withlittle-oversight?utm source.
99. Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1042.
100. Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1042.
101. Terhune, supra note 98.
102. Terhune, supra note 98.
103. Terhune, supra note 98.
104. Terhune, supra note 98.
105. McMillan, supra note 1.
106. McMillan, supra note 1.
107. McMillan, supra note 1.
108. Terhune, supra note 98.
109. See Clayworth, infra note 114 (Iowa case study); see also The Preventable Tragedy,
infra note 132 (Texas case study); see also Koetting, infra note 144 (Illinois case study); see
also Marton, infra note 169 (Kentucky case study).
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i. Iowa: Problematic Appeals Processes
Iowa provides an interesting case study in the managed care experience
because it initially used a private option to expand Medicaid, which fell apart
because of a lack of plans.'o Iowa had previously steadily expanded the use
of managed care first in 1986 through waiver for one county, then gradually
expanded through the 90s and 2000s to more counties."' However, before
mandating managed care for most enrollees in 2015 through a section
1915(b) waiver, very few enrollees were in managed care.11 2 Iowa contracted
with four MCOs in 2015, and two of those MCOs, Amerigroup and
AmeriHealth, faced legal problems in Illinois for not properly enrolling
beneficiaries and in Kentucky for falsely reporting the provision of
services. 113 Unfortunately, these problems in other states were a prologue
for issues in Iowa.
Severe problems with ensuring care for disabled children and elderly
beneficiaries have emerged." 4 In one case, after the elderly beneficiary won
on appeal at the state hearing, the MCO again denied the care when the
beneficiary requested pre-authorization for renewal of services, which will
likely put the beneficiary in an endless cycle of appeals."1 5 In another case,
AmeriHealth denied a converted van to transport a wheelchair to a 6-yearold with spinal muscular atrophy.11 6 The ALJ ruled in the family's favor,
saying that without the modified van, transportation could endanger the
child's life."' The denials of medically necessary care seem to be systemic
in the Iowa managed care program.
The state Ombudsman found the managed care companies to be "stubborn
and absurd" when asked to correct issues with denying care even after
beneficiaries had won state agency hearings to receive the care."s The
Ombudsman cited that companies do not send notices of reduction of services
with appeal rights when denying care because the companies claim they are
not technically reducing services but instead claim members did not need
services, services were duplicate or members accepted the plan with less
services."l 9 They denied services to beneficiaries despite the beneficiary
110. Wright et al., supra note 11, at 291-293.
111. Wright et al., supra note 11, at 294.
112. Wright et al., supra note 11, at 295; see also Jarlenski et al., supra note 10, at 1042,
1063.
113. Wright et al., supra note 11, at 295.
114. Jason Clayworth, CareDenied: How Iowa's MedicaidMaze is Trapping Sick and
Elderly Patientsin Endless Appeals, DES MOINES REG. & TRIB. CO. (2018),
https://features.desmoinesregister.com/news/medicaid-denials/.
115. IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT (2017).
116. Clayworth, supra note 114.
117. Clayworth, supra note 114.
118. IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115.
119. Id. at 1.
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winning an appeal, and took a year and a half to resolve a payment dispute.0
These findings were similar to the Des-Moines Register's deep dive into
Iowa's managed care system. 121
The Des-Moines Register examined 201 Medicaid appeals that went
before administrative law judges (ALJs) and involved the MCOs that took
over administering Medicaid in Iowa in 2016.122 The newspaper found that
the ALJs ruled for the beneficiary twenty-five times and for the companies
thirty-eight times and 138 appeals were withdrawn before the hearings were
held.1 2 3 The number of appeals making it to a state agency hearing in 2017
dropped between twenty-eight to forty-four percent from the previous five
years, but that can be attributed to the MCOs having internal appeals
processes before the beneficiary can go to the Agency.1 24 In three of the
previous five years, Iowa did not have mandatory managed care, suggesting
that there were more appeals under the traditional program.1 25 The decrease
is not necessarily attributed to fewer denials of care; beneficiaries may not
appeal because they are not aware that they can appeal.
As also noted by the Ombudsman, companies do a poor job of letting
beneficiaries know that they can appeal to the state agency.1 26 This is similar
to banks not letting borrowers know they have appeal rights under the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rules.1 27 The Ombudsman review
discovered that Medicaid beneficiaries are routinely denied care by managed
care companies, who often ignore state agency and court orders to provide
the care or make a new determination to deny care after the hearing, thus
triggering a new appeals process and leaving the beneficiary in a cycle of
appeals.1 28 The managed care system leaves beneficiaries caught in a maze
of corporate and state bureaucracy, fighting just to receive the medically
necessary care that they need and are entitled to receive.1 29 Unfortunately,
Iowa is not unique in the failings of its managed care system.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1-2.
Clayworth, supra note 114.
Clayworth, supra note 114.
Clayworth, supra note 114.
Clayworth, supra note 114.
Clayworth, supra note 114.
See IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115.

127. See Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Flagstar Bank for Violating New Mortgage
Servicing Rules (Sept. 29, 2014) (available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public events/597241/ehrlich borrowers bewa
re.pdf).
128. IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115.

129. See Clayworth, supranote 114.
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ii. Texas: Lackluster State Oversight

Beginning in 2013, Texas expanded managed care to cover most
enrollees.1 30 Until 2016, Texas also had an 1115(b) waiver for part of its
managed care program.131 The Dallas Morning News conducted a series
examining Texas' managed care companies and the effects on access to
care.1 32 In that state, politicians suggested that managed care would lower
costs and provide budget predictability. 33 In fact, costs have not lowered
because the companies requested more money for their contracts, money that
instead of going to beneficiaries for care goes to lobbyists for the
companies. 134 Similar to the findings in Iowa, the Morning News found that
insurance companies routinely denied care and left beneficiaries at the mercy
of corporate and state bureaucracy to attempt to get the care they are entitled
to and need.1 3 5 The newspaper also discovered in the case of a disabled
child, the representative for the managed care company was able to take over
the state agency appeal hearing and overwhelmed the mother of a disabled
child who expected to have a fair hearing.1 3 6 Just as Iowa's Ombudsman
pointed out that the MCOs make a mockery of the hearing process, the Dallas
Morning News' investigation shows similar problems plague the Texas
Medicaid program.137
Overall, the newspaper documented many failings of Texas' managed care
system.1 38 It found 8,000 Texans had unmet medical needs and appeals rose
twenty-six percent for the elderly and disabled adults and thirty-one percent
for foster children.1 3 9 Texas often fails to challenge or even review the MCO
policies that deny care to thousands and they fail to fine the companies for

130. Expansion ofManaged Care, TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://hhs.texas.gov/services/health/medicaid-chip/provider-information/expansionmanaged-care (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
13 1. MaryBeth Musumeci, Key Themes in CapitatedMedicaidManagedLong-Term
Services andSupports Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FouND. (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/key-themes-in-capitated-medicaid-managed-long-termservices-and-supports-waivers-issue-brief.
132. J. David McSwane & Andrew Chavez, The Preventable Tragedy ofD'ashonMorris:
When a GiantHealth Care Company Wanted to Save Money, a Foster Baby Paidthe Price,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 3, 2018), https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2018/pain-andprofit/partl.html [hereinafter The PreventableTragedy].
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id
138. See Id.
139. J. David McSwane & Andrew Chavez, As PatientsSuffer, Companies Profit: Years of
Poor State Oversight Have Allowed Companies to Skimp on Essential Carefor Sick Kids
and DisabledAdults, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 3, 2018),
https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2018/pain-and-profit/part2.html.
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their wrongful behavior, 4 0 not unlike the Trump Administration's Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau giving State Farm Bank a $0 fine for its
wrongful behaviors.' 4 ' Government watchdogs are asleep at the switch and
not conducting true oversight.
One promise of managed care was that it would expand access to doctors
when they were unwilling to take Medicaid under the FFS model, but in
Texas, the companies often overstate how many doctors are in their networks
and have not hired enough care coordinators to connect people with
treatment.1 42 Unfortunately, these problems are not unique to Texas as they
are remarkably similar to what the Iowa Ombudsman and the Des Moines
Register found in that state and to what Medicaid beneficiaries in Illinois
faced when it moved to managed care.143
iii. Illinois:

Administrative Processes

Illinois experienced several problems with its managed care and
outsourcing of redeterminations.1 4 4 Similar to Texas, Illinois politicians
embraced managed care because of expected savings from leaving the
traditional FFS model and did so in the wake of the financial crisis after
losing tax revenues. 14 However, one study showed Illinois has not saved
because its FFS model was already one of the lowest reimbursing in the
country.1 46 Thus, switching to capitation rates did not save the state
money.1 4 7 A state audit of Illinois MCOs found that costs ballooned under
managed care, from $212.8 million in fiscal year 2008 to $7.11 billion in
fiscal year 2016, but this can be explained by the switch to mandating
managed care enrollment after 2014. 14" The audit discovered the state
agency in charge of monitoring the companies was not keeping the necessary
records, such as denial data or the actual administrative costs, to effectively

140. Id.
141. Ryan Denham, State Farm Bank SanctionedOver Handling of CreditReports, WGLT

(Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.wglt.org/post/state-farm-bank-sanctioned-over-handling-creditreports#stream/0.
142. J. David McSwane & Andrew Chavez, Texas Pays Companies Millionsfor 'Sham
Networks' ofDoctors: Managed-CareCompanies Overstate the Number ofPhysicians
Available to Treat the State's Sickest patients, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 4, 2018),

https://interactives.dallasnews.com/20 18/pain-and-profit/part. html.
143. See IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN , supra note 115; Clayworth, supra note 114.
144. Michael Koetting, Medicaid Contradictions:Adding, Subtracting, and Redetermination
in Illinois, 41 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 225, 229, 233 (2016); see also Yamaki et al.,
supra note 45, at 141.
145. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 134.
146. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 141.
147. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 141.
148. FRANK J. MAUTINO, STATE OF IL. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT
OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS (2018).
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monitor the managed care contracts.' 49 The audit also found that the agency
made duplicate capitation payments for the same beneficiary, thus showing
an example of waste rather than savings, as promised by the political
rhetoric.'s The state sanctioned Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois for
having an inadequate network of doctors and hospitals for Medicaid enrollees
in its managed care and for not responding to grievances and appeals.''
Although sanctioning is a step in the right direction, the audit shows
concerning elements in the lack of state oversight.1 52
The state has also faced several difficulties with outsourcing
redeterminations for Medicaid and implementing a new IT system for
redeterminations, which shows that private companies are not set up to
handle Medicaid administration.1 5 3 The first problem revolved around the
state's 2011 contract with Maximus to handle checking the State's Medicaid
rolls and to recommend anyone not in compliance be taken off the state's
Medicaid rolls.1 54 Maximus' early work on the contract was so poor that the
State delayed payments for the first four months.155 The State's union
challenged the contract with Maximus because state law required the
redeterminations to be done by state employees, and the arbitrator ultimately
sided with the union.1 5 6 However, Maximus made recommendations for
cancellations, but those recommendations were made because the beneficiary
failed to return paperwork to Maximus after a rushed process.15 7 There is no
way to discover how many beneficiaries who were removed were in fact
ineligible, and this shows that a state or company can kick people off
Medicaid just by making the process onerous.iss
The second problem surfaced when the state tried to modernize its
redetermination system.1 59 In 2017, the state implemented a new IT system

149. Id. at i, v, ix.
150. Id. at i.
151. Lisa Schencker, Illinois Sanctions Blue Crossfor Medicaid ProgramViolations, CHI.

TRIB. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-medicaid-blue-crosssanctions-04 19-story.html.
152. MAUTINO, supra note 148, at i-ii.
153. Koetting, supra note 144, at 232-33; see also Rae Hodge, DHSFlounders:$300MIT
System Still Kicking Countless Illinoisans OffMedicaid and SNAP, Caseworkers
Overloaded, Claims Delayed Up to 7 Months, DAILY LINE (May 1, 2018),

http://thedaily1ine.net/chicago/05/01/20 18/dhs-flounders-300m-it-system-still-kickingcountless-illinoisans-off-medicaid-and-snap-caseworkers-overloaded-claims-delayed-up-to7-months.
154. Koetting, supra note 144 , at 228-29.
155. McMillan, supra note 1, at 14.
156. Koetting, supra note 144, at 230.
157. Koetting supra note 144, at 229.
158. Koetting, supra note 144, at 233-34.
159. Hodge, supra note 153, at 2.
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for redeterminations, designed by Deloitte.1 60 Immediately, the system
caused errors and backlogs in the annual process.161 The system also
wrongfully kicked thousands off Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) and delayed claims up to seven months as
caseworkers were overloaded.1 6 2 This again demonstrates that one way to
discourage enrollees is to make the process overly burdensome and difficult.
Former deputy director of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and
Family Services Michael Koetting draws on his experiences at the state
agency in charge of Medicaid by proposing a better process for
redeterminations through first using available information to detect
ineligibility, such as no longer being a state resident or being over-income,
and if none is available, the default should be to assume eligibility.1 63
Koetting also recommends making enrollee communications with the state
and companies easy and having actual audits of databases.1 64 Making
communications with the companies easy would be key because, as the
experiences of Iowa, Texas and Illinois show, beneficiaries attempting to
deal with the managed care maze often results in the loss of care.1 65
iv. Kentucky: Successful Implementation
Kentucky began experimenting with managed care in the 1980s and
gradually expanded through the 2000s.1 6 6 The state did so through a
combination of section 1915(b) and section 1115 waivers.1 6 7 The expansion
has not been without problems because the state had to sue one company for
falsely reporting the provision of services.1 68
Kentucky has shown some differences from the other states previously
discussed. The final report from the Urban Institute on Kentucky's managed

160. Hodge, supra note 153, at 2-3.
161. Chris Coffey, Glitch in Illinois Benefits System Bogs Down Process, Workers Say, NBC
CHI. (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:35 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/Glitch-inIllinois-Benefits-System-Bogs-Down-Process-Workers-Say-47934 1373 html.
162. Hodge, supra note 153, at 2.
163. Koetting, supra note 144, at 235-36.
164. Koetting, supra note 144, at 236.
165. Clayworth, supra note 114; McSwane & Chavez, supra note 132; and Yamaki et al.,
supra note 45 (explaining the loss of care that resulted when beneficiaries were forced to
attempt to navigate the managed care system on their own, in Iowa, Texas, and Illinois,
respectively).
166. Managed Care in Kentucky, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chipprogram-information/by-topics/delivery-systems/managed-care/downloads/kentuckymcp.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
167. Id. at 2.
168. Wright et al., supra note 11, at 295.
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care implementation found that it did save the state money.1 6 9 The report,
though, did not address if these savings were the result of denials of care or
reductions in care.1 7 0 The Urban Institute found steady improvements over
the course of implementation with the first year having trouble with the
rollout but by the third year, many problems were resolved.' 7 ' The report
concludes by recommending that the state create a monitor for managed care,
one that could check the companies in real time.1 72
The research and experiences from Iowa, Texas, Illinois and Kentucky
point to significant problems in the administration of managed care and in
beneficiaries' interactions with the private insurance company. Managed
care allows the state to outsource the administration of its Medicaid program
to insurance companies that then create their own processes for appealing
decisions before the beneficiary can appeal to the state agency. 173 Iowa and
Texas' systems make enrollees and their families fight the MCO for the
medically necessary care they need, which is not unique in its managed care
difficulties. 174 Much like Texas, Illinois implemented Medicaid managed
care, but has not reaped the promised rewards of cost savings.175
Furthermore, the evidence from Texas and Iowa shows that Medicaid MCOs
often deny medically necessary equipment and care and force beneficiaries
to navigate an appeals process maze they do not understand.1 76
Legislators sold Medicaid managed care with promises to cut waste and
provide cheaper care.' 7 7 However, that is not the case in practice.17 8
Enrollees in Medicaid managed care become caught up in a complex web of
corporate bureaucracy that sets them up to fail and face inefficient systems
that deny them the medically necessary care they need. This is similar to the
experience of expansion beneficiaries in Iowa, Michigan, Indiana and
Arkansas when those states implemented premiums, co-payments, lockout
periods, disenrolling and work requirements under Section 1115 waivers.

169. James Marton et al., MedicaidManaged Care in Kentucky, URBAN INST., vii (Feb.
2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/90196/2001253kentuckymedicaid managed care.pdf.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 26-28.
172. Id. at 51.
173. Terhune, supra note 98, at 2-3.
174. IOWA OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115, at 1; see also McSwane & Chavez,
supra note 132.
175. Yamaki et al., supra note 45, at 140.
176. McSwane & Chavez, supra note 132, at 9; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
supra note 127, at 2.
177. Robert Book, Benefits and Challenges ofMedicaidManaged Care, FORBES (Oct. 18,
2012, 10:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/10/18/benefits-and-challenges-ofmedicaid-managed-care/#4bb3d204720f.
178. Id.
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B. Section 1115 Waivers: Changing the Nature ofMedicaid
When states' demonstration waiver applications are approved, the HHS
must also approve the state's evaluation proposal, which explains how the
state will conduct a study to measure the waiver policy's effectiveness and
to test the underlying theory of the waiver.1 7 9 Studies involving section 1115
waivers will ultimately evaluate whether personal responsibility
requirements increase access.so Iowa, Michigan, Indiana, and Arkansas are
all states with waivers that substantially change the nature of Medicaid.'s'
Unfortunately, because their demonstration waivers have not ended or
recently ended, the final reports from the evaluation teams are not
available.1 8 2
However, interim reports are available and even some
independent studies in the case of Indiana, so the empirical evidence can be
examined to see what the waivers' effects have been on the ground. 8 3
i. Iowa: Premiums and Co-payments
In Iowa, the legislature first expanded Medicaid with a private option, just
as Arkansas did.1 4 However, Iowa's private option failed because of the
lack of available plans, so a traditional expansion was implemented instead
with a waiver for premiums and co-payments.s 5 Iowa's first section 1115
demonstration waiver for expansion ended in 2016,186 but the Iowa Wellness
Plan was extended to December 31, 2019.187 Critically, while enrollees with
income over the federal poverty line may be disenrolled for failing to pay the
premium by the end of a ninety-day grace period, Iowa's waiver does not

179. About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV,

https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1 115-demo/about-i115/index.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
180. Id.
181. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid DemonstrationWaivers: A Look at the
CurrentLandscape ofApproved and Pending Waivers Issue Brief HENRY J. KAISER FAM.

FouND. (Sep. 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Section-1 115-MedicaidDemonstration-Waivers-A-Look-at-the-Current-Landscape.
182. Id. at Appendix C.
183. Musumeci, et al., An Early Look at Medicaid Expansion Waiver Implementation in
Michigan and Indiana,Henry J. Kaiser Fain. Found. (Jan. 31, 2017),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-An-Early-Look-at-Medicaid-Expansion-WaiverImplementation-in-Michigan-and-Indiana.
184. Jane B. Wishner et al., Medicaid Expansion, the Private Option, and Personal
ResponsibilityRequirements: The Use ofSection 1115 Waivers to Implement Medicaid
Expansion Under the ACA (May 2015), URBAN INST.,

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/53236/2000235-Medicaid-ExpansionThe-Private-Option-and-Personal-Responsibility-Requirements.pdf.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 272.
187. Iowa Wellness Plan, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section11 15-demo/demonstration-and-waiver-list/?entry=15143 (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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include a lockout period for failing to pay because enrollees can re-enroll at
any time after being disenrolled.ss However, missed payments can become
a collectible debt after ninety days.' 8 9
The University of Iowa conducted two interim evaluations by surveying
beneficiaries.1 90 The first study found that less than a third of enrollees were
aware of the premium payment and about a quarter of respondents reported
it would worry them to pay a premium. 191 This suggests that there are
significant problems with communications with beneficiaries from the
MCOs. One concern about personal responsibility requirements is that their
effect will be to reduce access to care. This study found that respondents
reported it would be very easy to obtain a physical exam.1 92 However,
because Iowa does not lock out enrollees for failure to pay, measuring
reduction in care is difficult in any study of respondents that does not ask if
they have been denied medically necessary care by their insurance
company.1 93
The follow-up study found that very few of the respondents were aware
that completing a wellness exam was part of a program to waive the
contribution (premium) requirement.1 94 The study found that because
respondents did not know key details of the program, a majority of enrollees
would have been subject to the premium requirement in 2015.195 Again
pointing to problems with understanding the program and communications
from managed care organizations, enrollees reported confusion with the
receipt of bills or premium notices.1 96
Iowa disenrolled more than 14,000 for failure to pay a $10 premium from
January 2016 to September 2017.197 The terms of the waiver, though, allow
188. Katharine Bradley et al., Payingfor Medicaid Coverage:An Overview ofMonthly
Payments in Section 1115 Demonstrations,MEDICAID.GOV (Sept. 2019),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1 1 15-demo/downloads/evaluationreports/paying-for-medicaid-coverage.pdf.
189. Id. at 2.
190. Peter Damiano et al., Iowa Health and Wellness Plan Evaluation Interim Report, IOWA
DEP'T HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 2015),

https://dhs.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/IHAWP_Interim Report 2015.pdf?013120190345;
see also Natoshia M. Askelson et al., Health Behaviors Incentive ProgramEvaluation
Interim Report (Mar. 1, 2016), MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/ia/Wellness-Plan/ia-wellnessplan-bhvrs-int-rpt-mar-2016.pdf.
191. Damiano et al., supranote 190, at 67-68.
192. Damiano et al., supranote 190, at 68.
193. Bradley et al., supra note 188, at 2.
194. Askelson et al., supra note 190, at 32.
195. Askelson et al., supra note 190, at 19.
196. Askelson et al., supra note 190, at 33.
197. Phil Galewitz, When Medicaid ChargesPremiums, Thousands FallBehind, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (March 2, 2018, 9:55 AM),
http://www.governing.com/templates/govprint article?id=475581313.
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them to reapply for coverage at any time; there are no lock out periods in
lowa.' 98 The public's awareness of this has not been tested, and the effect of
disenrollment may be that it discourages the public from reapplying for
coverage because they simply give up. This remains to be tested by further
research.
ii. Michigan: Premiums
Michigan's first demonstration waiver for the Healthy Michigan Plan,
which ended in 2018, let the state charge premiums of up to two percent of
the beneficiaries' income, which can be between $19-25 a month.' 99 These
premiums were sent to a health savings account, administered by
Maximus. 200 Michigan did not disenroll for nonpayment but "consistently"
unpaid premiums may be garnished from lottery winnings and state income
20
tax returns.201
In 2018, Michigan had to mail letters to 13,550 beneficiaries
to warn them about non-payment and also sent 68,000 enrollees notices that
the state would begin garnishing state income tax refunds and lottery
winnings.
About 7,000 beneficiaries paid as a result, and the state
collected money from 19,400 tax refunds and fifty-nine from lottery
winnings.203 The University of Michigan's study on the Healthy Michigan
Plan found that eighty-eight percent of respondents thought the premium
payments were fair, and seventy-two percent agreed that they would like to
pay. 204 However, from January through August 2017, fewer than half
actually paid the premium despite some reporting that they want to pay the
premium.205 Only nineteen percent reported doing the health risk assessment
despite being able to receive a premium waiver if they did it. 20 6
The study was part of the University of Michigan's Institute for Healthcare
Policy and Innovation state waiver evaluation.207 In the interim report,
survey respondents reported that 37.8 percent did not remember completing

198. Id.; See also Bradley et al, supra note 188, at 2.
199. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 272.
200. See generallyMcMillan, supra note 1.
201. MAxIMus, HEALTHY MICHIGAN PLAN MI HEALTH ACCOUNT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REPORT 18 (2017).
202. Galewitz, supra note
203. Galewitz, supra note
204. Galewitz, supra note
205. Galewitz, supra note
206. Galewitz, supra note

197.
197.
197.
197.
197.

207. Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver Amendment Evaluation Proposal, attached to
Letter from Andrea J. Casart, Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion Demonstrations, to Chris
Priest, Dir., Mich. Medical Sers. Admin. (Aug. 8, 2017) (available at
www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1l 15/downloads/mi/Healthy-Michigan/mi-healthy-michigan-eval-dsgnappvl-20170808.pdf).
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the health risk assessment while 53.4 percent did it, but only three percent
did it for the reward and only 0.2 percent did it to save money. 2 08
Beneficiaries receive monthly statements for their accounts, and eighty-nine
percent reported that they reviewed the statements with eighty-eight percent
saying that it helped them be aware of healthcare spending. 209 However,
forty-eight percent did not know if premiums were charged regardless of
health care use (they are not), and fifty-two percent did not know if they could
be disenrolled. 2 10 This suggests that the enrollees are not understanding the
terms of the waiver policy.
CMS approved an extension to Michigan's waiver through 2023 and also
allowed changes to the project. 211 The changes allow premiums of up to five
percent of income for expansion enrollees, and added a requirement that the
health risk assessment or healthy behavior be completed or the beneficiary
will be disenrolled.212 The waiver approval says that the state should be able
to continue studying whether health risk assessments and healthy behaviors
have a positive effect on health and whether premiums encourage consumer
behaviors.213 The current research suggests these policies, in fact, do neither.
Just as in Iowa, one question for waiver states is whether the effect of
personal responsibility requirements will be to reduce coverage and access
to care, contrary to the objectives of Medicaid. Once getting coverage
through the Healthy Michigan Plan, sixty-six percent used primary care
while only 36.9 percent used the emergency room for care; 2 14 therefore, it
appears that the Healthy Michigan Plan, when enrollees are not kicked off,
expands coverage and access to care. However, it remains to be seen if
premiums reduced coverage and access to care.
A related question is whether Medicaid and insurance coverage itself
provides good effects. In Michigan, Medicaid itself seems to have relieved
stress and reduced the damaging effects of medical debt.215 Respondents said
that they wanted health insurance before getting expansion coverage and that
they had trouble with medical bills before getting coverage.216 Research
should follow-up on other potential good effects, such as lessening housing
208.

SUSAN DoRR GOOLD ET AL., U MICH. INST. FOR HEALTHCARE POL'Y & INNOVATION,
HEALTHY MICHIGAN VOICES BENEFICIARY SURVEY INTERIM REPORT 11-12 (2016).

209. Id. at 27.
210. Id at 33.

&

211. Healthy Michigan Plan, attached to Letter from Seema Verma, Ctrs. for Medicare
Medicaid Sers. To Rick Snyder, Governor (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/mi/mi-healthy-michigan-ca.pdf.
212. Id
213. Id
214. GOOLD et al., supra note 208 at 16, 21.
215. Id. at 26-27.
216. Id. at 26.
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instability as seen in one study on ACA marketplace subsidies where
recipients were less likely to experience missed rent or mortgage
217
payments.21 Research is not complete in Michigan and Iowa, but there is a
wealth of empirical evidence from Indiana's waiver experience.2 18
iii. Indiana:

Premiums, Co-payments and Lockout Periods

The HIP began in 2008 as an expansion waiver to give coverage to the
population that would become the ACA expansion group.2 19 In 2015, the
state changed the plan to add personal responsibility requirements in the form
of premiums, co-payments, disenrolling and lockouts, which were needed to
get the expansion through the Indiana legislature and signed by thenGovernor Mike Pence. 2 20 All enrollees, even those below the poverty line,
must make premium payments, which are not premiums in the usual sense
but payments into a health savings account, known as POWER. 2 2 1 All
enrollees are initially in HIP Plus, which has more benefits than HIP Basic,
but if those below the federal poverty line fail to pay the premium, they are
shifted to HIP Basic while expansion adults are disenrolled after sixty days
of non-payment.222 Expansion adults are then locked out of coverage for six
months before they can reapply while there is no lockout for those below the
poverty line.223 Therefore, Indiana's research data provides some of the
strongest indicators of what happens when personal responsibility
requirements are combined with harsh consequences for non-compliance
with a complicated system.
First, the state's official evaluation interim report by the Lewin Group
showed that more than half of those eligible to make premium payments did
not do so, with those failing to make payments citing affordability and
confusion as the reasons for not paying.224 As a result of failing to pay, the
study found 2,677 people were disenrolled and 21,445 people were moved
from HIP Plus to HIP Basic. 2 25 However, another look at the data suggests
fifty-seven percent of individuals with income at or below 100 percent of the
federal poverty line were moved to HIP Basic, and fifty-one percent were

217. Emily A. Gallagher, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, & Michal Grinstein-Weiss, The Effect of
Health Insurance on Home Payment Delinquency: Evidence from ACA Marketplace
Subsidies, 172 J. PUB. EcON. 67, 77, 79, 82 (2019).
218. See generallyLEWIN GROUP, infra note 224.
219. See generally Grogan et al., supra note 10.
220. Grogan et al., supranote 10, at 266.
221. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 279.
222. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 273.
223. Watson Premiums, supra note 8, at 273.
224. LEWIN GROUP, INDIANA HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT
(2016).
225. Id. at 44.
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disenrolled.226 Using the results from the Lewin Group study, the Kaiser
Family Foundation concluded that administrative requirements create
barriers to coverage.227
Second, other academic studies produced different results. 22 8 One showed
that Indiana's policies result in the state not having as many coverage gains
as other traditional expansion states. 22 9 Another study found that thirty-nine
percent had not heard of POWER accounts, but twenty-nine percent had
heard of the accounts but did not make payments while thirty-six percent had
made payments. 2 30 Of those who paid, fifty-seven percent said they thought
about prices but forty percent said the accounts were hard to understand,
which casts doubt on the justification that this encourages consumer
behaviors. 23 1 Nine percent reported being locked out of their accounts. 5
These studies show that Indiana's policies have had the destructive effect of
reducing coverage through confusion about the program and kicking people
off Medicaid.
More recently, it was found that one in three were kicked off for failure to
pay, 23 3 and in a state that is the only one to impose lockouts, that is a
significant barrier to coverage for the expansion population. These occurred
in 2018 because until 2017, the federal government did not allow Indiana to
enforce the lockout period, stating it was contrary to the objectives of
Medicaid.234 However, the Trump administration allowed enforcement of
the provision.2 35 In October 2018, the state announced that it would suspend
the lockout policy, but did not discuss the details of the suspension.236

226. Robin Rudowitz, MaryBeth Musumeci, & Elizabeth Hinton, Digging Into the Data:
What Can We Learn from the State Evaluation ofHealth Indiana (HIP 2. 0) Premiums,
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-

Digging-Into-the-Data-What-Can-We-Learn-from-the-State-Evaluation-of-Healthy-IndianaHI-20-Premiums.
227. Id.
228. See Freedman et al., infra note 229; see also Sommers et al., infra note 230.
229. Seth Freedman et al., Learningfrom Waiver States: CoverageEffects Under Indiana's
HIP Medicaid Expansion, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 936, 939 (2018).
230. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., New Approaches in Medicaid: Work Requirements,
Health Savings Accounts, and Health CareAccess, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1099, 1099 (2018).
231. Id. at 1103.

232. Id.
233. Galewitz, supra note 197.
234. Jake Harper, New IndianaRules Could Lock HIP Enrollees Out of Coveragefor Six
Months, SIDE EFFECTS (Feb. 6, 2018), www. sideeffectspublicmedia.org/post/new-indianarules-could-lock-hip-enrollees-out-coverage-six-months.
235. Id
236. Lauren Bavis, Indiana Halts Policy That Locks Some Medicaid Members Out of
Coverage, SIDE EFFECTS (Oct. 26, 2018), www. sideeffectspublicmedia.org/post/indianahalts-policy-locks-some-medicaid-members-out-coverage.
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In 2019, Indiana began enforcing a new waiver for the HIP, this time
including work requirements.237 National Public Radio analyzed the state's
waiver application and found they misrepresented the studies from the 2015
waiver, which supports the contention that HHS does not have enough
information when evaluating the waivers. 238 While Indiana starts
enforcement of its work requirements, a hint at what will likely occur as a
result comes from Arkansas' experience with its work requirements
beginning in July 2018.
iv. Arkansas: Premiums and Work Requirements
Like Iowa, Arkansas initially expanded Medicaid with a private option,
which allowed politicians to frame it as not Medicaid expansion or a
government program.23 9 Unlike Iowa, Arkansas still has the private option
instead of traditional expansion.240 Beginning in June 2018, Arkansas
imposed work requirements on its expansion adults,24 1which made it the first
state to do so since Stewart v. Azar halted Kentucky's work requirement
pending reconsideration.24 2 Arkansas also wanted to change eligibility to a
different income threshold, but it was not allowed to change that.243
Beginning in 2016, the State started charging $13 premiums, but only
twenty percent paid, perhaps because enrollees do not lose coverage if they
fail to pay. 24 4 In 2019, the State plans to intercept tax refunds to make up for
the failed payments. 245 This seems to undercut the notion that the programs
are creating consumerism and teaching personal responsibility, although
237. Phil Galewitz, IndianaAdds Work Requirement To Medicaid, Will Block Coverage If
PaperworkIs Late, NPR (Feb. 2, 2018, 4:21 PM), www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/02/02/58282803 9/indiana-adds-work-requirement-to-medicaid-will-block-

coverage-if-paperwork-is-la.
238. Jake Harper, Indiana'sClaims About Its MedicaidExperimentDon'tAllCheck Out,
NPR (Feb. 24, 2017, 5:01 AM), www.npr.org/sections/health-

shots/20 17/02/24/5 16704082/indiana-s-claims-about-its-medicaid-program-dont-all-checkout.
239. Robert B. Leflar, Red-State Health Reform: Threading the PoliticalNeedle, 24 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 410, 416-417 (2015).
240. Dylan Scott, Medicaid'sPrivate Option is Nearly Gone, Vox (Sep. 2, 2018, 9:40 AM),
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/8/3 1/17806656/medicaid-private-insurance-states-

work-requirements-voxcare.
241. Jennifer Wagner, Commentary: As Predicted, EligibleArkansas Medicaid Beneficiaries
Struggling to Meet Rigid Work Requirements, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Jul. 30,

2018), www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-as-predicted-eligible-arkansas-medicaidbeneficiaries-struggling-to-meet-rigid.
242. Stewart, 308 F.Supp. 3d at 272.
243. Phil Galewitz, Feds Issue Split Decision on Arkansas Medicaid Waiver, GOVERNING
(Mar. 6, 2018, 10:28 AM), www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/khn-

arkansas-cms-trump-medicaid.html.
244. Galewitz, supra note 197.
245. Galewitz, supra note 197.
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conservatives would say that enrollees do not pay because there is no
punishment for failing to pay. However, studies from other waiver states do
not support the idea that enrollees would pay if there was a penalty for nonpayment; 246 enrollees likely do not pay for a range of reasons including the
financial burden.247
To implement work requirements, states need to modify eligibility
systems, create compliance systems, inform beneficiaries of changes and hire
additional staff. 248 These changes all create additional costs and are
potentially harmful to beneficiaries seeking to navigate reforms, as was the
case in Arkansas where tens of thousands of individuals lost coverage due to
system implementation challenges. 2 49 From July to December, reports of
enrollees losing coverage based on non-compliance increased every
month. 25 0 The Kaiser Family Foundation warned that more would lose
coverage every month because, despite outreach efforts, enrollees did not
know about the work requirement reporting. 25 1 By the end of 2018, almost
17,000 enrollees lost coverage for failing to report work hours, though they
are allowed to reapply in 2019.252 Arkansas Governor Hutchinson defended
the program "as accomplishing its intent" because 4,100 enrollees secured
jobs in line with the work requirements.253 One might more cynically say
that the program accomplished its intent because 17,000 were kicked off of
Arkansas' Medicaid rolls; 25 4 one intent behind work requirements and the

246. See Samantha Artiga, Petry Ubri, & Julia Zur, The Effects ofPremiums and Cost
Sharing on Low-Income Populations: UpdatedReview ofResearch Findings,HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 1,2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Effects-

of-Premiums-and-Cost-Sharing-on-Low-Income-Populations (reporting findings that
individuals refrain from obtaining and maintaining Medicaid and CHIP in the face of
premiums).

247. Id. ("Studies also show that those who become uninsured following premium increases
face increased barriers to accessing care, have greater unmet health needs, and face
increased financial burdens.").
248. Jennifer Wagner & Judith Solomon, States' Complex Medicaid Waivers Will Create
Costly Bureaucracyand Harm Eligible Beneficiaries, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y
PRIORITIES (May 23, 2018), www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-23-18health2.pdf.
249. Id. at 1-2.
250. Wagner, supra note 241; see also Robin Rudowitz, MaryBeth Musumeci, & Comelia
Hall, A Look at October State Datafor Medicaid Work Requirements in Arkansas, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-A-Look-at-

October-State-Data-for-Medicaid-Work-Requirements-in-Arkansas.
251. Rudowitz et al., supranote 250.
252. Benjamin Hardy, Update: WorkRequirement Ends Medicaid Coveragefor 4600 More
Arkansans in December, ARK. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018, 1:08 PM),

https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/20 18/12/17/work-nile-ends-medicaidcoverage-for-4600-more-arkansans-in-december.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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complicated structure of managed care is to make being on Medicaid so
onerous that beneficiaries simply give up.
One way Arkansas made its work requirement program onerous and
unnecessarily difficult is the manner through which enrollees were required
to report their compliance.255 For example, enrollees had to report work
through an online portal, which creates barriers for potential elderly, disabled
and low-income enrollees.256 Arkansas has some of the worst Internet access
in the country, and online reporting is particularly burdensome for the
Medicaid population, which is poor and less likely than members of the
general population to have reliable Internet access.257 It is similar to how
Illinois made the only way to apply for Hardest Hit housing assistance
online. 2 58 A cynical reading is that states purposely design programs to make
it too difficult to comply and thus, hard to be poor.
This also reflects a lack of thought to the hardships of poverty and the
reality of lives for impoverished populations. Requiring Medicaid enrollees
to get jobs harms low-income people when they live in towns where there
are no jobs; it is not easy for impoverished people to travel to find work when
they do not have money for relocation. One man had ajob at a poultry plant,
tried to comply with the work requirement reporting, but failed because he
did not realize he had to report every month. 25 9 Thus, he lost his Medicaid
coverage. 260 One woman believed she was exempt but received letters
stating she needed to create an online account for reporting. 261 She cannot
create an account because she does not have an email address and thus, she
lost her coverage for not reporting.2 62 In one Arkansas county, even the
public library has a sign saying it does "not offer the Internet. "263 The court
recently stayed Arkansas' work requirement because HHS' approval was
255. Id.; see also Anuj Gangopadhyayaet al., Under Medicaid Work Requirements, Limited
InternetAccess in Arkansas May Put CoverageAt Risk, URBAN INST. (Oct. 29, 2018),

https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/under-medicaid-work-requirements-limited-internetaccess-arkansas-may-put-coverage-risk (pointing to barriers facing those individuals without
regular internet access).
256. Gangopadhyaya et al., supra note 255.
257. InternetAccess in Arkansas, BROADBANDNOW, https://broadbandnow.com/Arkansas
(last updated Mar. 6, 2019) (revealing Arkansas to be the 50th most connected state in the
Union); see also Gangopadhyaya et al., supra note 255 (finding that one in five adults
between the ages of 19 and 49 with incomes below 138 percent of the Federal Poverty
Level, the limit for Medicaid eligibility in Arkansas, reported having no internet access at
home).
258. Illinois HardestHit Program,ILL. HARDEST HIT, https://www.illinoishardesthit.org/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
259. Greshamv. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2018).
260. Id.
261. Amy Goldstein, A Job-scarce Town Struggles with Arkansas'First-in-nationMedicaid
Work Rules, THE WASH. POST (March 27, 2019).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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arbitrary and capricious, but the Governor indicated he would appeal the
decision.264
Work requirements are just the beginning of changes that the Trump
administration signaled it would approve; CMS would likely agree to let
states impose drug testing and lifetime coverage limits as well. 26 5 However,
research shows that work requirements do not actually encourage more
beneficiaries to get jobs because the vast majority of beneficiaries of public
welfare programs are either already working, are elderly or are disabled, and
are thus exempt from the work requirements, leaving a very small proportion
of the welfare population who would benefit from getting a job.266 Indeed,
one study showed that in Kansas only eleven percent of the combined
Medicaid and uninsured population would be likely to look for a job, while
forty-nine percent were already working and thirty-four percent had a
disability. 26 7 But from Arkansas' experience, it becomes clear that work

requirements will, as some fear, simply make it more difficult to be in
poverty, kick beneficiaries off the Medicaid rolls and impede access to
insurance and health care. It will also impact people like Sue Fredericks in
Indiana who find it difficult to keep a job and keep insurance through the
HIP.268 What is missing from discussing the numbers of people kicked off
or locked out of coverage are stories like Sue's and the impact on her and
those like her; what is also missing when the conversation is about "personal
responsibility" is also talking about core consumer protections that should
exist for Medicaid beneficiaries in particular but also all health insurance
customers.
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE MISSING ELEMENT

The political rhetoric around expanding Medicaid focused on encouraging
"personal responsibility" and promoting "consumerism" by teaching
Medicaid beneficiaries about how insurance works through premiums and

264. Amy Goldstein, Arkansas Governor Seeks Appeal ofDecision Voiding Medicaid Work
Rules, THE WASH. POST (March 28, 2019).
265. Mattie Quinn, Work Requirements May Be Just the Beginning ofMedicaid Changes
Under Trump, GOVERNING (Jan. 12, 2018, 5:00 PM),

http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-medicaid-work-tnump-drugtesting-kentucky.html.
266. Heather Hahn et al., Work Requirements in Social Safety Net Programs:A Status
Report of Work Requirements in TANF SNAP, Housing Assistance, and Medicaid,URBAN
INST., 15, (Dec. 2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95566/work-

requirements-in-social-safety-net-programs.pdf (as an example, this study reported that in
2015, a housing assistance program benefitted a group of households of which 81 percent
were elderly, disabled or with a member already working).
267. Sommers et al., supra note 230, at 1103-04.
268. McMillan, supra note 1.
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co-payments. 26 9 Key to this switch in rhetoric was the belief that individuals
helped by the Medicaid expansion population should work to be good
consumers of health care.270 Indiana said it encouraged "consumerism" by
enrolling those who paid premiums in a superior plan with added benefits
relative to those who did not pay, and by putting funds into a health savings
account through which payers would pay their premiums. 27 1 Missing from
the discussion of "consumerism" was consideration of core consumer
protections, such as debt collection, grace periods, and limits on premium
amounts.
Some waivers include consumer protections for debt collection, others do
not. For example, Michigan's plan treats unpaid premiums as debts to the
state that allow for the state seizure of tax refunds and lottery winnings. 2 72
Iowa's first demonstration waiver included that unpaid premiums were
treated as a debt owed to the state, but the state allowed a hardship exemption
as well as a ninety-day grace period for payment.273 However, unpaid
premiums do become a debt owed to the state when the enrollee in question
does not apply for renewal and had no claims for services delivered after the
month of the last premium payment. 2 74
Indiana's 2015 plan did not allow payment of unpaid premiums to be a
condition of re-enrollment, but did allow resulting debts to be collectible with
the caveat that the debt not be reported to credit reporting agencies, not be
used to file a lien against a home, not be used as the basis of a lawsuit nor
wage garnishment, and not be sold as a debt to a third party.2 7 5 These policies
effectively made the debt uncollectible. Indiana's new demonstration
waiver, approved by the Trump administration, included no such
27
protections.276 Arkansas' 2014 waiver included the creation of matching

269. Grogan et al., supranote 10, at 263-65 (discussing the nuances of the "personal
responsibility" and "consumerism" rhetoric across the contexts of several states).
270.
271.
272.
273.

Grogan
Grogan
Watson
Watson

et al., supranote 10, at 265-66.
et al., supranote 10, at 266.
Premiums, supra note 8, at 272.
Premiums, supra note 8, at 272.

274. See generally Iowa Wellness Plan, attached to Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Mikki Stier, Medicaid Dir., Iowa Dep't of Human Sers.
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-

Topics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/ia/ia-wellness-plan-ca.pdf).
275. See generallyHealthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (2015), attached to Letter from Marilyn

Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Joseph Moser, Medicaid Dir.,
Ind. Family & Soc. Sers. Admin. (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/i 115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-

2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-appvl-0 1272015.pdf.
276. See generallyHealthy Indiana Plan (2018), attached to Letter from Demetrios

Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Sers., to Allison
Taylor, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
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health savings accounts for participants, which are funded both by the
participant and the state, and result in participant debt to the state when a
participant who doesn't claim hardship underpays an obligation.277 The
state's newest waiver program provides that unpaid premium debt may be
collected but not reported to credit reporting agencies, nor used as the basis
for legal claims, liens or wage garnishments, nor can it be sold.278
As the above survey shows, treatment of debt collection vanes in waiver
states. 2 79 Sometimes CMS imposes consumer protections, such as effective
bans on debt collection, credit reporting or wage garnishments.2 80 In other
waivers, CMS imposes no such consumer protections. 28 1 Instead of allowing
states to experiment, CMS should use one uniform debt collection limitation
in waivers; the lack of uniformity must frustrate the MCOs, which contract
in multiple states.
Similarly, some waivers include grace periods for missed payments and
limits on the amount of income that can go toward premiums; others do
not. 28 2 For example, Indiana's first waiver included a sixty-day grace period
and a limit of two percent of income going toward a premium.28 3 The State's
newer waiver keeps the grace period but changes premium limitations from
a two-percent-of-income cap to assessing premiums based on income
bands. 28 4 Iowa's first waiver included a ninety-day grace period and a
requirement that the premium for expansion adults could only be $10,285
while the new waiver keeps the grace period but changes the premium to a

Topics/Waivers/i 15/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plansupport-20-ca.pdf.
277. See Arkansas Health Care Independence Program, attached to Letter from Marilyn
Tavenner, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Sers., to John Selig, Dir., Ark. Dep't of Human
Servs. (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-

Information/By-Topics/Waivers/ 115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-ProgramPrivate-Option/ar-works-demo-appvl- 123 120 14.pdf.

&

278. See Arkansas Works, attached to Letter from Seema Verma, Ctrs. for Medicare
Medicaid Sers., to Asa Hutchison, Governor, 18 (Mar. 4, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf.

279. See generallyHealthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (2015), supra note 275; see also Healthy
Indiana Plan (2018), supra note 276; see also Arkansas Health Care Independence Program,
supra note 277; see also Arkansas Works, supra note 278.
280. See generallyHealthy Indiana 2.0 Plan (2015), supra note 275; see also Healthy
Indiana Plan (2018), supra note 276; see also Arkansas Health Care Independence Program,
supra note 277; see also Arkansas Works, supra note 278.
281. See Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (2015), supra note 275; see also Healthy Indiana Plan
(2018), supra note 276.
282. See Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (2015), supra note 275.
283. Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (2015), supra note 275.
284. Healthy Indiana Plan (2018), supra note 276.
285. Iowa MedicaidExpansion Waiver, MACPAC (Aug. 2016), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-

content/uploads/2015/07/Iowa-Medicaid-Expansion-Waiver-.pdf.
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limit of five percent of family income not exceeding five dollars for those
below the federal poverty line and ten dollars for those over the federal
poverty level up to 138 percent of the federal poverty line. 286 Arkansas'
waiver includes a ninety-day grace period and two percent of income limit
for premiums. 28 7 Finally, Michigan's waivers had no grace period, though
premiums could not be more than two percent of income (five percent for the
renewal) and repayment of past premiums are required to renew. 288 These
grace periods are vulnerable to being not enforced evenly because it is not
clearly defined if only one month must be paid or if the enrollee is two
months behind by the sixtieth day, the whole two months of premiums need
to be paid. 28 9 The ACA included a ninety-day grace period on Marketplace
plans. 29 0 The Department of Housing and Urban Development requires
housing to only be thirty-one percent of one's income in order to be
considered affordable.2 9 1 Similarly, controls on premium amounts help
define healthcare affordability. This shows some consumer protection
elements have been included, but the differences in waiver states shows more
thought needs to be given to consumer protections in health insurance,
especially for the vulnerable Medicaid population.
What is particularly worrisome is that enrollees likely do not understand
the communications that are sent to them.292 Persons with low literacy
generate higher charges for healthcare and have poorer health status, are
more apt to be hospitalized, and make more visits to the emergency room
than literate counterparts.293 One study suggested that state Medicaid
programs reduce the literacy level of their enrollment and renewal processes
and establish literacy guidelines so that materials help applicants understand

286. Healthy Indiana Plan (2018), supra note 276.
287. Arkansas Work Section 1115 Waiver DemonstrationFactSheet, MEDICAID.GOV (Mar.
5, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-

Topics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/ar/ar-works-fs.pdf.
288. Healthy Michigan Plan (2013), attached to Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Ctrs. for

Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Stephon Fitton, Dir., Mich. Medical Servs. Admin., 14
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-

Topics/Waivers/i 15/downloads/mi/Healthy-Michigan/mi-healthy-michigan-cms-amendappvl-12302013.pdf; see also Healthy Michigan Plan (2018), supra note 211.
289. Healthy Michigan Plan (2018), supra note 288, at 14 ("No sooner than 60 days after the

invoice date of the missed premium, beneficiaries who fail to pay the monthly contribution
will be terminated from coverage after proper notice.").
290. Premium Payments, Grace Periods & Termination,HEALTHCARE.GOV,

https://www.healthcare.gov/apply-and-enroll/health-insurance-grace-period/

(last visited

Mar. 29, 2019).
291. FED. HOUSING ADMIN., FHA SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK 413 (2016).

292. Barry D. Weiss & Raymond Palmer, RelationshipBetween Health Care Costs and Very
Low Literacy Skills in Medically Needy and Indigent MedicaidPopulation, 17 J. AM. BOARD
FAM. PRACTICE 44, 46 (Jan.-Feb. 2004).
293. Id. at 44.
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the process.294 Another study showed the importance of communications
that beneficiaries can understand by showing that women better understood
the sterilization process when consent forms were written at a lower reading
level. 2 95 Another study recommended that managed care companies change
their written communications from a tenth-grade reading level to a fourth- or
sixth-grade reading level to ensure that beneficiaries understand the appeals
process, but found resistance inside the organizations to the recommended
change.29 6 Because healthcare consumers must understand the process
within organizations, they need to be able to read and understand what they
are being sent; a change to "ifyou have a problem, here's what to do" would
be an improvement over "ifyou have a grievance or appeal ... "297 Without
these changes, Medicaid enrollees are more likely to experience problems
when left to their own devices in a system difficult to navigate on one's own.
At a time when the Trump administration and states are pulling back on
the administrative state and enforcement of regulations, an analysis of how
the policies accepted by Medicaid waivers shows the importance of legal aid
and monitoring the actions of private companies to ensure that enrollees are
not being wrongfully denied access. In the context of home foreclosure, the
assistance of a lawyer has been shown to be vital in homeowners receiving
loan modifications.298 It stands to reason that the assistance of a lawyer in
navigating managed care and holding companies responsible would make a
difference.
It is also important to change the conversation from personal responsibility
to consumer protection and have more advocacy groups to do so. There are
a few groups, such as Families USA and the National Health Law Program,
which are doing important work. 29 9 However, there needs to be more, and
conversation must turn from imposing harsh requirements to ensuring
consumers are treated fairly by the proposed changes and by MCOs.
The above analysis of waiver policies approved by CMS shows how
consumer protections do not extend to healthcare and health insurance.
294. Susmita Pati et al., Reading Level ofMedicaid Renewal Applications, 12 ACAD.
PEDIATRICS 297, 299-300 (Jul. - Aug. 2012).
295. Nikki B. Zite & Lorraine S. Wallace, Use of a Low-Literacy Informed ConsentForm to
Improve Women's Understandingof Tubal Sterilization, 117 OBSTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY
1160, 1164 (May 2011).
296. Jane Root & Sue Stableford, Easy-to-Read Consumer Communications:A Missing Link
in MedicaidManaged Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1, 13 (1999) ("resistance"

stemmed from internal pressures on staff to roll-out Medicaid products, and lack of time).
297. Id at 2, 4.
298. Amy Loftsgordon, When Should IHire a ForeclosureAttorney?, LAWYERS.COM,

https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/bankruptcy/foreclosures/when-to-hire-a-foreclosureattomey.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
299. Fightingfor Health Rights for All, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, https://healthlaw.org/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2019); see also AboutFamilies USA, FAMILIESUSA,

https://famiiliesusa.org/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
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While the ACA enacted some consumer protections,300 insurance and
healthcare do not implicate other consumer protection statutes. For the most
part, policymakers do not see them as consumer protection issues. 301 They
sold premiums as making enrollees have "skin in the game," but this logic
only applies to low-income people, who do not have lobbyists.

3 02

It is the

Wild West in terms of oversight and regulation with healthcare consumers
left unarmed.
Medicaid enrollees face a complicated system between managed care and
waivers, a system that is rigged against them. Often, low-income clients,
who are Medicaid and Medicaid expansion enrollees, do not understand the
notices they are receiving or the enrollment process.30 3 It is a system that
outsources state regulation to private companies and often states do not step
in to enforce regulations. Medicaid waivers created this environment.
Waivers that were meant to innovate and improve Medicaid have not done
so based on the available evidence from the states. Instead, they impeded
access to health insurance and healthcare for the impoverished and
demonstrate the need for legal services and robust state oversight.
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